-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Tue Apr 21 06:03:59 AM EDT 2026 Owner: My blog - https://itsnothing.net. Admin: The Hitchhiker's Guide to Online Anonymity - https://anonymousplanet.org Network Admin: Privacy, Security and Anonymity [m] Space - https://matrix.to/#/#psa:anonymousplanet.net Latest bitcoin block hash: 00000000000000000000dc62138da4946eca629f7d7ce1d97f277674864d1317 I positively confirm I am in complete control of all my key material and domains. All previous keys have been revoked as part of standard OPSEC key rotation procedures. Do NOT encrypt communications to my old keys, I will not read them. The key currently published on https://keyoxide.org/8B3A74890536BAD50D9376EBF1CB32F67E3302A1 with a fingerprint of 8B3A74890536BAD50D9376EBF1CB32F67E3302A1, is my only PGP key for public communication. It IS published on public keyservers now. Please refrain from uploading it there (again). Someone already broke this rule. Permanent record of old and new PGP keys: pub ed25519/0xF1CB32F67E3302A1 2024-03-29 [SC] Key fingerprint = 8B3A 7489 0536 BAD5 0D93 76EB F1CB 32F6 7E33 02A1 uid [ultimate] nopenothinghere@proton.me pub ed448/0x77EEB38ED21240BE 2026-03-20 [SC] [expires: 2036-03-17] Key fingerprint = 77EEB 38ED2 1240B E00E6 27002 76B2F 98D35 7B253 C17C2 F5E5B uid [ultimate] Architect (PQC Kyber Key) To fetch the full key, you can simply do: gpg --import pgp.txt ** Note: this keyserver is experimental.[0] I still have yet to add these keys to the I2P keyserver pool, and I don't know if I will. If you have previously signed my key but did a local-only signature (lsign), you will not want to issue the following, instead you will want to use --lsign-key, and not send the signatures to the keyserver. ** gpg --sign-key 0xF1CB32F67E3302A1 I'd like to receive your signatures on my key. You can either send me an e-mail with the new signatures (if you have a functional MTA on your system): gpg --export 0xF1CB32F67E3302A1 | gpg --encrypt -r 0xF1CB32F67E3302A1 --armor \ | mail -s 'OpenPGP Signatures' Additionally, I highly recommend that you implement a mechanism to keep your key material up-to-date so that you obtain the latest revocations, and other updates in a timely manner. You can do regular key updates by using parcimonie[1] to refresh your keyring. Parcimonie is a daemon that slowly refreshes your keyring from a keyserver over Tor. It uses a randomized sleep, and fresh tor circuits for each key. The purpose is to make it hard for an attacker to correlate the key updates with your keyring. I also highly recommend checking out the excellent Riseup GPG best practices doc, from which I stole most of the text for this transition message ;-) https://riseup.net/en/security/message-security/openpgp/gpg-keys Please let me know if you have any questions on how to verify. Nope (Anonymous Planet) 0. https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d6955275f 1. https://directory.fsf.org/wiki/Parcimonie -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iMUFARYKAEUiIQV37rOO0hJAvgDmJwAnay+Y01eyU8F8L15bezdxrKuZ/gUCaedM RBsUgAAAAAAEAA5tYW51MiwyLjUrMS4xMiwyLDEAAAWOAcQNg9uelzK68ke349SJ 0GJqxEEctVwEwa0OcJjDwgnskC7qtoT6yHq+mEGKBjDdL5Zs3NORIjHcpoABx363 b0A1cvuufz0ONhf8tf74HRKk5wieqgo/p6q0/PpNVIbDgpuRkAzubS8rsVJb9FNX E+VGQi4LAA== =aWEc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----